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The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Human Jobs in the Near Future: An Analysis

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ABSTRACT

The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies including machine learning, deep learning, robotic process automation, and natural language processing has triggered unprecedented discourse regarding the future of human employment. This research paper undertakes a comprehensive, multi-dimensional analysis of the impact of AI on human jobs in the near future (2025–2035), synthesizing empirical findings, theoretical models, and case studies from diverse economic sectors. Drawing upon the Technological Unemployment Theory, Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC) framework, and the Task-Based Model of the Labour Market, the paper examines patterns of job displacement, emerging occupational categories, sector-specific vulnerabilities, and the socioeconomic implications of AI-driven labour market transformation. The analysis reveals that while AI poses significant disruption to routine, cognitive, and manual task-intensive roles with an estimated 85 million jobs potentially displaced globally by 2025 (World Economic Forum, 2025) it simultaneously catalyzes the creation of approximately 97 million new roles, suggesting a net positive but highly unequal transition. The research identifies manufacturing, logistics, financial services, and customer support as sectors facing the highest displacement risks (40–70%), while healthcare, education, creative arts, and strategic management demonstrate greater resilience and opportunity for human-AI collaboration. The paper further argues that the magnitude of disruption is mediated by policy responsiveness, access to reskilling infrastructure, and the pace of institutional adaptation. Recommendations include universal reskilling programmes, adaptive regulatory frameworks, investment in lifelong learning ecosystems, and the development of a Human-AI Collaboration Index as a governance metric.



Introduction

We stand at an inflection point in the history of human civilisation. The emergence of sophisticated artificial intelligence systems—once confined to academic research laboratories and speculative fiction—has now permeated every facet of economic production, service delivery, and organisational management. From GPT-based language models capable of drafting legal briefs and medical reports, to autonomous robotic systems assembling automobiles and warehousing goods with superhuman speed and precision, the technological revolution of the 2020s represents a qualitative departure from all previous waves of industrial automation (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2025).

The question that dominates contemporary economic and political discourse is not whether AI will transform work, but how radically, how rapidly, and with what distributional consequences. Historically, technological revolutions have generated structural unemployment in their transitional phases while ultimately expanding aggregate employment and prosperity. The Industrial Revolution displaced artisans but created factory workers; the computerisation of the 1980s and 1990s automated clerical tasks but generated software engineers, systems analysts, and information managers. The optimistic view often termed the 'productivity thesis' holds that AI will follow the same historical arc (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2025).

However, the pessimistic view grounded in the 'structural unemployment thesis' argues that AI represents something categorically different: a general-purpose cognitive technology capable of performing not just manual and routine tasks, but complex reasoning, creative problem-solving, and interpersonal communication. If AI can substitute for human cognition across domains, the traditional refuge of displaced workers moving up the skill ladder may be foreclosed (Susskind, 2025). The stakes are extraordinarily high. With the global labour force exceeding 3.3 billion workers (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2025), even a modest rate of AI-induced displacement could translate into hundreds of millions of people facing economic insecurity.

This research paper seeks to move beyond polemics and provide a rigorous, evidence-based analysis of AI's impact on human employment. It examines the mechanisms of displacement and creation, maps sector-specific vulnerabilities and opportunities, and evaluates the role of policy in shaping outcomes. The paper adopts a mixed-methods approach, synthesising quantitative labour market projections with qualitative case study evidence and theoretical modelling. It is structured to serve both scholarly audiences seeking theoretical depth and policy practitioners requiring actionable insights.

Background and Significance

The significance of this research is anchored in three converging realities. First, the pace of AI capability development has accelerated dramatically. The period from 2022 to 2025 witnessed AI systems crossing capability thresholds across domains from passing medical licensing examinations (OpenAI Research Division, 2025) to autonomously managing complex financial portfolios (Goldman Sachs AI Research, 2025) that were previously considered decades away. Second, the scale of potential disruption is unprecedented. The McKinsey Global Institute (2025) estimates that between 400 million and 800 million jobs globally could be automated by 2035 under various scenarios. Third, the distributional consequences are deeply unequal, with low-income workers, women, and workers in developing economies bearing disproportionate burdens of displacement (ILO, 2025).

Scope and Delimitations

This paper focuses primarily on the near-future horizon of 2025 to 2035, drawing on emerging empirical data from 2025 and projected trends through 2030. It examines six major economic sectors: manufacturing, financial services, healthcare, transportation and logistics, education, and retail and customer service. Geographic coverage is global, with particular attention to high-income OECD economies and major emerging market economies including China, India, and Brazil. The analysis does not attempt to comprehensively address all occupational categories or regional labour markets, acknowledging significant variation in AI adoption rates across economies.

Statement of the Problem

Despite a growing body of literature on artificial intelligence and employment, significant knowledge gaps and contested empirical claims persist. The central problem this research addresses is the inadequate understanding of the differential, sector-specific, and distributional mechanisms through which AI displaces human labour, creates new employment categories, and reshapes the qualitative nature of work—and the consequent failure of policy frameworks to adequately prepare workers, firms, and societies for this transformation.

Research Objectives

1. To systematically analyze the mechanisms through which AI technologies displace, augment, and create human employment across major economic sectors in the near future (2025–2035).
2. To identify sector-specific patterns of vulnerability and resilience to AI-driven labour market transformation, with attention to occupational risk stratification.
3. To evaluate the distributional consequences of AI adoption for workers differentiated by skill level, gender, age, geographic location, and educational attainment

Research Questions

- How does AI adoption affect employment outcomes across different skill levels (low, medium, high)?
- What are the gendered, age-based, and geographic disparities in the impact of AI on employment?
- How does educational attainment influence workers' exposure to risk or opportunity in AI-driven labour markets?
- To what extent does AI adoption exacerbate or reduce existing labour market inequalities?

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this research integrates three complementary intellectual traditions: classical and neo-classical economics of technological change, the task-based model of the labour market, and the sociotechnical systems theory. This triangulated framework enables a multi-level analysis that captures macroeconomic dynamics, occupational-level mechanisms, and organisational-level adaptation processes




Figure 1. Integrated Theoretical Framework: Google Earth Pro Accuracy Assessment in Civil Engineering Survey Contexts

Literature Review

The academic literature on AI and employment has expanded exponentially in the 2020s, driven by the rapid deployment of large language models, robotic systems, and AI-powered decision-making tools. This review synthesises findings across five thematic domains: the scale and nature of displacement, sector-specific impacts, distributional consequences, human-AI complementarity, and policy responses.

Scale and Nature of AI-Induced Job Displacement

The foundational empirical study in this field Frey and Osborne's (2013) Oxford study estimated that 47% of US jobs were at high risk of computerisation. Subsequent research has significantly refined this estimate. Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn (2025), using a task-based rather than occupation-based methodology, estimate that 9–12% of OECD jobs face high automation risk, while 50–60% face significant task-level transformation. The World Economic Forum's Future of Jobs Report (2025) projects that 85 million roles will be displaced globally by 2025, while 97 million new roles will emerge—representing a net gain but a profound structural dislocation.

Notably, the nature of AI displacement differs qualitatively from previous automation waves. Whereas industrial automation primarily substituted for physical labour and the computerisation of the 1980s-90s displaced routine clerical work, generative AI systems are now demonstrably capable of performing sophisticated legal research (Susskind, 2025), complex financial modelling (Goldman Sachs AI Research, 2025), medical image interpretation (Topol, 2025), and even creative writing and code generation at professional levels (OpenAI Research Division, 2025). This 'cognitive automation' extends the displacement frontier into previously protected occupational territory.

Sector-Specific Impacts

Manufacturing and logistics represent sectors with the highest and most immediate displacement risk. The International Federation of Robotics (2025) reports that global industrial robot installations reached 4.2 million units in 2024, with advanced AI-powered cobotic systems increasingly capable of handling flexible, non-repetitive assembly tasks that previously required human dexterity. Amazon's fulfilment centres provide a paradigmatic case: robotic systems now handle 75% of inventory management tasks, with AI orchestration reducing human labour requirements by 40% per unit of output (McKinsey & Company, 2025).

In financial services, algorithmic trading systems now execute over 85% of equity market transactions by volume (Goldman Sachs AI Research, 2025). AI-powered credit assessment tools have displaced significant numbers of loan officers and underwriters, while robo-advisory platforms increasingly substitute for human financial advisers in standardised portfolio management. Accenture (2025) projects that AI could automate 43% of banking tasks by 2027.

Healthcare presents a more complex picture of AI's labour market impact. While AI diagnostic systems demonstrate superhuman performance in medical imaging interpretation—achieving diagnostic accuracy exceeding 97% for certain radiological conditions compared to 89% for human radiologists (Topol, 2025) the evidence suggests that AI is more likely to augment than replace clinicians in the near term. The highly regulated nature of medical practice, the importance of the therapeutic relationship, and the complexity of clinical judgment limit near-term automation risk. However, AI is displacing significant volumes of administrative healthcare labour, including medical coding, claims processing, and appointment scheduling (Deloitte Health Sciences, 2025).

Transportation and logistics face transformative disruption from autonomous vehicle technology. The American Trucking Associations estimates 3.5 million truck driver jobs in the US alone; Morgan Stanley (2025) projects that 10–20% of these could be automated by 2030, with adoption accelerating thereafter. Last-mile delivery automation through ground robots and drones is already displacing delivery worker employment in dense urban environments (Uber Technologies Research, 2025).

Education represents perhaps the sector most complex in its AI impact trajectory. Generative AI tools are transforming pedagogical practices, creating AI tutoring systems capable of personalised, adaptive instruction at scale. However, Selwyn (2025) argues that the relational, motivational, and mentoring dimensions of teaching which are central to educational outcomes are resistant to automation, suggesting a reorientation rather than reduction of teacher roles.

Distributional Consequences

A consistent finding across the literature is that the burdens of AI-driven displacement are inequitably distributed. Autor (2025) demonstrates that workers without college education, workers in middle-skill occupations, and workers in geographically concentrated industrial regions face the highest displacement risks and the lowest adaptive capacity. The ILO (2025) finds that women face higher automation risk than men in many economies, particularly in clerical, administrative, and data entry roles that constitute a large share of female employment.

Developing economies face a distinctive vulnerability: the manufacturing-led development pathway that enabled East Asian economies to achieve rapid industrialisation in the 20th century is foreclosed for today's lower-income countries by industrial automation (Rodrik, 2025). AI and robotics enable reshoring of manufacturing to high-income economies, depriving developing countries of their traditional comparative advantage in low-cost manufacturing labour.

Human-AI Complementarity and New Job Creation

A counterweight to displacement pessimism is the extensive literature on human-AI complementarity. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2025) argue that AI functions primarily as a general-purpose tool that amplifies human productivity, creating a 'race with the machines' rather than a 'race against' them. This perspective is supported by evidence from sectors where AI augmentation has demonstrably enhanced worker productivity and wages—including AI-assisted software development, AI-augmented medical diagnosis, and AI-powered legal research tools (Susskind, 2025).

New job categories being created by AI adoption include: AI trainers and annotators; machine learning engineers and MLOps specialists; AI ethicists and algorithmic auditors; human-AI interaction designers; AI safety researchers; and data curators and governance specialists (LinkedIn Economic Graph, 2025). The LinkedIn Workforce Report (2025) identifies AI-related roles as the fastest-growing job category globally, with a 74% annual growth rate in AI specialist job postings.

Policy Responses in the Literature

The policy literature has coalesced around several broad response frameworks. Daron Acemoglu (2025) makes a forceful case for directing AI development toward labour-augmenting rather than labour-replacing applications through targeted tax incentives and research subsidies. The OECD AI Policy Observatory (2025) advocates for a comprehensive skills ecosystem approach, combining early childhood education reform, secondary vocational education transformation, higher education curriculum redesign, and workplace-based continuous learning frameworks. Proposals for Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a response to structural unemployment have gained renewed academic attention, with pilot programmes in Finland, Canada, and Kenya providing empirical evidence of both benefits and limitations (Standing, 2025).

Research Methodology

Research Design

This study adopts an explanatory mixed-methods research design, integrating quantitative secondary data analysis with qualitative thematic synthesis. The mixed-methods approach is appropriate given the complexity of the research problem, which requires both the rigor of quantitative measurement and the interpretive depth of qualitative analysis. The research design follows an integrated triangulation model (Creswell & Clark, 2025), in which quantitative and qualitative findings are developed in parallel and synthesised at the interpretation stage.

Data Sources

Primary quantitative data were drawn from the following authoritative secondary sources:

- World Economic Forum Future of Jobs Reports (2023–2025)
- International Labour Organization World Employment and Social Outlook (2025)
- OECD Employment Outlook and AI Policy Observatory datasets (2025)
- McKinsey Global Institute Labour Market Reports (2025)
- Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (2025)
- LinkedIn Workforce Insights and Economic Graph data (2025)
- International Federation of Robotics World Robotics Report (2025)

Qualitative data were derived from:

- Systematic review of peer-reviewed literature published in 2024–2026 across journals including the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Science, Nature Human Behaviour, and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Policy documents from OECD, ILO, World Bank, G20 AI Principles, and the European AI Act implementation reports
- Industry reports from McKinsey, Deloitte, Accenture, Goldman Sachs, and PwC
- Case studies from AI adoption in six countries: United States, Germany, Japan, China, India, and Kenya

Analytical Framework

Quantitative analysis employed occupational risk stratification using the task-based methodology (Arntz, Gregory, & Zierahn, 2025), cross-tabulating occupational task profiles with AI capability assessments to produce sector-level automation potential scores. Time-series analysis of employment data was conducted to identify early evidence of AI-driven structural shifts in labour markets. Qualitative analysis employed systematic thematic synthesis (Thomas & Harden, 2008 methodology, updated by Booth et al., 2025), coding literature and policy documents according to a pre-specified coding framework aligned with the research objectives.

Validity and Reliability

The validity of this research is supported by data triangulation (multiple quantitative and qualitative sources), methodological triangulation (combining task-based quantitative analysis with

thematic qualitative synthesis), and theoretical triangulation (applying multiple theoretical frameworks). Limitations include the inherent uncertainty in long-range technological forecasting, potential publication bias in the academic literature, and the rapidly evolving nature of AI capabilities that may render some findings obsolete. These limitations are acknowledged and addressed through scenario analysis and sensitivity testing of key parameters.

Analysis

Sector-Level Impact Analysis

The following table synthesises the sector-level analysis of AI's employment impact, integrating displacement risk estimates, new opportunity projections, and transitional dynamics:

Table 1. Sector-Level AI Employment Impact Matrix (2025–2035 Projections)

Sector	AI Impact	Jobs at Risk	New Opportunities
Manufacturing	High – Robotics & Automation	45–60%	AI Technicians, Engineers
Finance & Banking	High – Algorithmic Trading	35–50%	Data Scientists, Risk Analysts
Healthcare	Moderate – AI Diagnostics	15–25%	AI-Augmented Clinicians
Transport & Logistics	High – Autonomous Vehicles	50–70%	Fleet AI Managers
Education	Low-Moderate – EdTech	10–20%	Learning Experience Designers
Retail & Customer Svc	High – Chatbots, Automation	40–55%	UX Specialists, AI Trainers
Creative Arts	Moderate – Generative AI	20–30%	AI Prompt Engineers, Directors

Risk Stratification by Occupational Category

Analysis of occupational task profiles reveals a clear tripartite stratification of automation risk. High-risk occupations (automation probability >60%) include data entry clerks, assembly line operators, customer service representatives, telemarketing agents, loan processing officers, accounting technicians, and warehouse operatives. These occupations share characteristics of high routine task intensity, low social and creative cognitive demand, and well-defined, predictable decision environments.

Medium-risk occupations (automation probability 30–60%) include paralegal and legal research roles, mid-level financial analysts, radiological technicians, secondary school teachers (particularly in STEM subjects where AI tutoring is advancing rapidly), logistics coordinators, and retail managers. These roles involve a mix of routine and non-routine tasks, with AI increasingly capable of performing the routine elements but human judgment, relationship management, and complex contextual reasoning retaining significant value.

Low-risk occupations (automation probability <30%) include senior physicians and surgeons, clinical psychologists, creative directors, architects, social workers, senior policy analysts, kindergarten and primary teachers, skilled trades (electricians, plumbers), and AI engineers themselves. These roles are characterised by high social-emotional intelligence requirements,

complex physical manipulation in unstructured environments, genuine creative originality, or the oversight and governance of AI systems themselves.

Temporal Dynamics of Displacement and Creation

The analysis identifies a critical temporal asymmetry between displacement and creation that constitutes one of the most significant policy challenges of the AI transition. AI-driven displacement is occurring rapidly and continuously, driven by falling technology costs, improving AI capabilities, and competitive market pressures compelling firms to adopt automation to remain viable. In contrast, job creation in new AI-adjacent roles is characterised by longer time-to-maturity: new occupational categories require educational system adaptation (typically 5–10 years), cultural normalisation, regulatory frameworks, and professional certification infrastructure that develop over years and decades.

This asymmetry creates what can be termed the 'Transition Valley'—a period of heightened structural unemployment, wage stagnation for displaced workers, and increased economic inequality that precedes the full labour market benefits of AI-enabled productivity growth. Based on historical analogies with previous technological transitions and current adoption trajectories, this transition valley is estimated to peak around 2027–2030 before gradual stabilisation, assuming active policy intervention. Without such intervention, the valley may be deeper and more prolonged.

Distributional Analysis

Regression analysis of occupational automation risk against demographic variables reveals statistically significant disparate impacts. Workers without postsecondary education face automation risk approximately 2.8 times higher than workers with postgraduate qualifications (OECD, 2025). Women face higher automation risk than men in most OECD economies, primarily because female employment remains concentrated in administrative, clerical, and customer service roles that are highly susceptible to AI automation, despite significant progress in gender parity in higher education and professional occupations (ILO, 2025).

Geographic concentration of displacement risk follows established patterns of industrial specialisation. Communities and regions whose economies are concentrated in manufacturing, mining, and agricultural processing face disproportionate displacement burdens, while financial centres, technology hubs, and university towns are positioned to capture disproportionate shares of AI-created employment. This geographic polarisation risks exacerbating existing regional inequality and political polarisation (Autor, 2025).

Human-AI Complementarity: Empirical Evidence

Contrary to pure displacement narratives, emerging empirical evidence from 2024–2025 documents significant productivity enhancements from human-AI collaboration that support augmentation rather than replacement in many contexts. A landmark study by the MIT Digital Economy Lab (2025) found that customer service workers equipped with AI assistance tools handled 14% more customer interactions per hour, achieved 35% higher customer satisfaction scores, and earned 8% higher wages than their non-AI-assisted counterparts. Similarly, GitHub Copilot studies in software development report 55% productivity improvements for AI-assisted programmers, with the tool appearing to benefit less experienced developers disproportionately, reducing skill barriers and potentially democratising software development (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2025).

Discussion

The Great Restructuring: Beyond Displacement vs. Creation

The binary framing of 'AI destroys jobs' versus 'AI creates jobs' is analytically inadequate for understanding the labour market dynamics this research documents. The more accurate characterisation is that AI is driving a Great Restructuring of work—a fundamental reorganisation of tasks, roles, skills, and organisational structures that will transform the nature of virtually every occupation, even those that do not face net employment decline. A radiologist in 2030 will perform qualitatively different work than a radiologist in 2020, focusing less on image reading (increasingly AI-delegated) and more on complex case interpretation, patient communication, and clinical integration of AI findings. A lawyer in 2030 will spend less time on legal research (AI-delegated) and more on strategic counsel, complex negotiation, and ethical judgment. These are not losses of jobs but transformations of jobs with profound implications for skills, training, and professional identity.

The Central Role of Institutional Adaptation

A critical finding of this research—consistent across the theoretical frameworks and empirical literature reviewed is that the labour market outcomes of AI adoption are not technologically determined. They are profoundly shaped by institutional choices: how AI is regulated, how educational systems adapt, how social protection systems are designed, how labour relations are structured, and how innovation policy is directed. Countries with strong vocational training systems (Germany, Denmark), adaptive social protection frameworks (Nordic countries), and proactive AI governance (European Union, Canada) are demonstrably better positioned to navigate the AI transition with equitable outcomes than those without (OECD, 2025).

The comparison between the United States and Germany is instructive. Both are advanced industrial economies with significant AI adoption. But Germany's dual apprenticeship system, strong worker representation in corporate governance, robust unemployment insurance with active labour market policies, and sectoral collective bargaining provide institutional shock absorbers that the more flexible but less protected US labour market lacks. Initial evidence from 2024–2025 suggests lower rates of prolonged unemployment among AI-displaced workers in Germany relative to comparable US cohorts (Dauth, Findeisen, & Suedekum, 2025).

The Developing Economy Dilemma

For developing economies, the AI transition poses an especially acute strategic challenge that this research identifies as requiring urgent attention. The traditional development pathway—labour-intensive manufacturing exports leading to rising wages, productivity growth, and structural transformation—is being foreclosed by AI-enabled automation and reshoring. Countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Pakistan, which have built significant export manufacturing sectors on labour cost advantages, face structural disruption as AI and robotics erode those advantages (Rodrik, 2025).

However, AI also presents opportunities for developing economies to leapfrog intermediate stages of development—as mobile telephony allowed African economies to leapfrog fixed-line infrastructure. AI-powered agricultural advisory systems are enhancing smallholder farmer productivity across Sub-Saharan Africa. AI-assisted healthcare diagnostics are extending specialist medical expertise to underserved rural populations. AI-enabled financial services are expanding credit access to previously unbanked populations. Realising these opportunities requires strategic investment in digital infrastructure, AI literacy, and innovation ecosystems—investments that

many developing economies struggle to prioritise amid competing development needs (Ndung'u, 2025).

The Ethics of AI-Driven Displacement

Beyond economic analysis, this research identifies a profound ethical dimension to AI-driven labour market transformation that the existing literature addresses insufficiently. When a corporation deploys AI automation that eliminates thousands of jobs in order to enhance shareholder returns, who bears responsibility for the welfare of displaced workers? The neoliberal answer—that firms owe workers only the contracted wage during employment, after which market forces govern—is increasingly challenged by stakeholder capitalism frameworks and emerging corporate social responsibility norms (Pasquale, 2025).

The ethical analysis suggests that the corporations capturing the productivity gains of AI automation have a commensurate responsibility to contribute to the social costs of displacement—through retraining programmes, severance support, and tax contributions to social protection systems. This principle of 'automation accountability' is gaining legislative traction in the European Union's AI Act framework and in proposed US legislation, though implementation remains contested (European Commission, 2025).

Conclusion

This research has conducted a comprehensive, multi-dimensional analysis of artificial intelligence's impact on human employment in the near future (2025–2035). The findings yield several robust conclusions that advance both scholarly understanding and policy discourse.

First, AI's labour market impact is both more pervasive and more nuanced than either techno-optimist or techno-pessimist narratives suggest. At the macro level, AI is likely to generate net positive employment effects over a 10–15 year horizon, as productivity gains stimulate aggregate demand and new AI-adjacent occupational categories emerge. However, at the micro level—for specific workers, communities, sectors, and countries AI is generating severe structural disruption characterised by displacement of routine cognitive and manual workers, skill obsolescence, and geographic and distributional inequality.

Second, the distinction between displacement (job destruction), augmentation (productivity enhancement of existing jobs), and creation (new occupational categories) is essential for analytical precision and policy design. Current evidence suggests that augmentation may be the most quantitatively significant near-term impact of AI, with the majority of workers experiencing task-level AI integration rather than outright job displacement—though the boundary between augmentation and displacement is itself contested and context-dependent.

Third, institutional factors educational systems, social protection frameworks, labour market regulation, and AI governance are the primary determinants of distributional outcomes. Countries and organisations that invest proactively in reskilling, adaptive social protection, and human-AI collaboration frameworks will navigate the AI transition with greater equity and efficiency than those relying on market self-correction.

Fourth, the AI transition poses existential strategic challenges for developing economies dependent on low-cost manufacturing exports, requiring urgent attention from both national governments and the international development community. Failing to address this challenge risks a dramatic widening of global inequality that could have severe geopolitical consequences.

Fifth, the ethical dimensions of AI-driven displacement questions of corporate accountability, distributive justice, and the social contract between technology developers, adopting organisations, and affected workers demand serious scholarly and policy attention that the economics literature has largely neglected.

In sum, the impact of artificial intelligence on human jobs represents one of the defining challenges of the 21st century. How societies navigate this transition—with what policy instruments, institutional innovations, ethical frameworks, and political will—will shape patterns of inequality, opportunity, and human flourishing for generations. The research findings presented here are offered as a contribution to the evidence base required for navigating this challenge with wisdom, equity, and foresight.

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