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Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Major Developments and Historical Trajectory

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ABSTRACT

Civil-military interactions have been a recurrent and fundamental subject in the political history of Pakistan. Since independence, the connection between the civilian political institutions and the military establishment has been a major factor in the country's political development, governance, institutional change and democratic process. This article offers a historical perspective on the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan. It traces the significant trends from the early years of independence to the modern period. It studies the changing dynamics of interaction between the civilian administrations and the military establishment in different eras of Pakistan's political history; the formative years, military rule, transition to civilian governments and the experience of democracy thereafter. Emphasis is placed on important political developments, constitutional changes, military interventions, political transitions and institutional linkages that influenced the civil-military relationship across time. The study demonstrates how the character of civil-military ties was affected by political instability, institutional fragility, national security concerns, leadership considerations and the changing domestic and international context at different points in time. The study does not present the relationship as static but analyzes its evolving patterns and highlights major continuities and transformations in Pakistan's political history. The study is historical and descriptive, discussing the main changes in chronological order and placing them in the broader political and institutional framework. The paper continues with a general assessment of the key patterns in Pakistan's civil-military relations and their implications for understanding the trajectory of the country's politics and institutions.

Introduction

One of the most important features of Pakistan's political history is civil-military interactions. The connection between civilian political institutions and the military establishment has been intricately intertwined with political development, governance, institutional evolution, and the democratic experience of Pakistan since its inception in 1947. Whereas most political relationships developed slowly within stable constitutional settings, civil-military relations in Pakistan developed against a backdrop of political turmoil, institutional deficiencies, security issues, leadership crises, and shifting domestic and international factors. Therefore, much attention is required to the interaction between the civilian authority and the military institution to comprehend the political history of Pakistan.

Civil military interactions have not been homogeneous throughout Pakistan's history. It has gone through many phases, from periods of direct military dictatorship to periods of elected civilian governments. The military sometimes seized direct political power and at other times stayed outside formal government structures, but continued to be a significant player in national security, foreign policy, and political affairs. Similarly, civilian governments have had a mixed record in their interactions with the military establishment, with periods of collaboration and others of institutional friction and political differences. These shifting patterns point to the fact that civil-military interactions in Pakistan cannot be seen as a monolithic, continuous phenomena; rather, they are an ongoing historical process, affected by the political context of each period.

Roots of Pakistan's civil-military ties can be traced back to early years of independence. At its inception Pakistan faced many major problems, such as the division of military and administrative assets, the Kashmir dispute, refugee settlement, economic difficulties, and the development of new state institutions. The situation helped establish a rather strong position for the military and the bureaucracy in the formation of the state. At the same time political leadership encountered problems in constructing robust democratic and constitutional institutions. The early political and institutional development was thus vital for shaping the later relationship between civilian political authority and the military.

The development of civil-military ties was also affected by the constitutional and political crises of the 1950s. The institutional uncertainty was caused by the collapse of the Constituent Assembly in 1954, political instability, frequent changes of government and the lack of a solid constitutional framework. The political climate gradually made room for non-elected governmental entities. The introduction of martial law in 1958 and the takeover of power by General Ayub Khan was a crucial turning point in the political history of Pakistan. The imposition of military rule altered the relationship between the military and civilian political institutions and established a precedent that would influence Pakistan's political evolution for the next few decades.

The reign of Ayub Khan was the first extended direct experience of military rule in Pakistan. During this period political institutions were restructured and a new constitutional order implemented. The Constitution of 1962 set up a presidential government and established a controlled political system. There was economic and administrative improvement, but political resistance grew steadily, especially in the last years of Ayub Khan's leadership. His resignation in 1969 and the following takeover of General Yahya Khan showed the continued importance of the military in the political system of Pakistan. General Yahya Khan's time was one of great political developments leading to the crisis of 1971 and independence of East Pakistan. The political struggle over the general elections of 1970, the issues related to the transfer of power, civil discord, and the resulting military confrontation had a significant impact on the political and institutional history of Pakistan. The events of 1971 led to the birth of Bangladesh and raised fundamental

questions about the nature of democratic governance, institutional frameworks and the role of the military in politics. This was followed by the transfer of power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by the military command which marked the beginning of another key era in the growth of civil-military relations.

The Bhutto period was an attempt to reinstate civilian political control after the terrible events of 1971. The 1973 constitution created the groundwork for a parliamentary system and legally specified the institutional organization of the state. Nevertheless, the interaction between the political leadership and the military was an important characteristic of the period. Political opposition, domestic unrest, and differences between the administration and opposition groups, eventually generated a crisis which resulted in the military takeover of July 1977. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's rise to power brought in another protracted spell of military rule and marked a fundamental change in the relationship between the military and civilian democratic institutions.

Zia-ul-Haq era had a deep influence on political and institutional development of Pakistan. Martial law was enforced, political activity suppressed and a process of Islamization introduced in various fields of state and society. The Soviet incursion in Afghanistan in 1979 increased the strategic importance of Pakistan and the influence of the military and the security institutions in national and international policy. The Afghan war also changed Pakistan's regional and international standing. The death of General Zia in 1988 ushered back parliamentary politics in the country, marking a new phase in civil-military ties. Between 1988 and 1999, Pakistan was governed alternately by civilian governments, primarily under the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. Democratic institutions were restored, but civilian governments continued to operate in a political environment in which the military was a significant institutional actor. Governments were ousted before the end of the constitutional term, political tensions worsened and the interactions between the elected leadership and state institutions remained difficult. The removal of several governments and the political instability of the 1990s highlighted the difficulty of building a durable equilibrium between elected civilian authority and other powerful state institutions.

The military again took direct political authority in October 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The Musharraf period was another important chapter in the civil-military relations in Pakistan. The government embarked upon a policy of political restructuring and undertook institutional and constitutional reforms. The events of September 2001 and Pakistan's subsequent role as a significant partner of the United States in the worldwide battle against terrorism further enhanced the strategic significance of the military establishment. At the same time, political resistance and calls for the restoration of democratic institutions progressively intensified, especially during the last years of Musharraf's administration.

The return of an elected civilian administration in 2008 marked another key phase in Pakistan's civil-military ties. The Pakistan Peoples Party government finished its constitutional term and was succeeded by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz government after the general elections of 2013. The post-2008 period was marked by the notable fact that civilian governments stayed in power for long periods of time without direct military takeovers. However, the questions of the responsibilities of civilian institutions and the military continued to be an essential element of Pakistan's political conversation. Issues of national security, foreign policy, counterterrorism, relations with India and Afghanistan and internal political changes continued to shape the broader civil-military interaction. The subsequent political developments have further highlighted the

shifting character of civil-military relations in Pakistan. The general elections of 2018 resulted in the coming to power of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and another major political transition in 2022. During this period, the civilian political leadership-military institution interface remained a focus of political and academic debate. Trends in politics over the last few years have also shown that civil-military relations are not limited to episodes of direct military intervention but rather include a wider set of institutional interactions within a democratic political setting.

A study of Pakistan's political history, therefore, suggests that civil-military relations have seen some distinct but interrelated phases. The relationship has been shaped by direct military control, civilian governments, constitutional reforms, political crises, national security difficulties and changes in the regional and international environment. The balance between civilian control and military influence has changed over the years, in line with the country's shifting political and institutional context. The significance of a historical study of civil-military interactions is that it offers a larger perspective to comprehend the political development of Pakistan. A historical viewpoint helps recognize trends of continuity and development across different times rather than treating each political occurrence in isolation. It also helps to clarify how institutional experiences, built over time, informed future political events. Such an approach provides a deeper understanding of the interaction between the civilian political institutions and the military establishment.

This article, therefore, analyzes the major events and historical evolution of civil military relations in Pakistan from independence to the present times. This is a historical and descriptive approach and the relationship is discussed in important eras of Pakistan's political history. The study centers on key political changes, periods of military rule, civilian government, constitutional changes, institutional relationships and major national and international events that impacted the connection. Rather than exploring civil-military relations under one theoretical framework, the intention is to offer a broad historical account of their development and changing character. The article aims at eventually proving that civil-military ties have been part and parcel of Pakistan's political history. They have evolved in close tandem with the country's constitutional development, political stability, democratic institutions, national security environment and changing patterns of governance. A historical review of these interactions offers a chance to comprehend both the continuities and changes that have defined Pakistan's political journey and provides a wider background for discussing the nature of civil-military relations in modern Pakistan.

Literature Review

This essay uses hybrid peace and security and civil-military interactions theories. Democratic civilian control, in which democratically elected civilian bodies oversee the military, links the two theoretical clusters. The variety of civil-military philosophies that interpret democratic supervision makes civilian control difficult to implement. Institutionalist (divergence) (Huntington 1957), sociological (convergence) (Janowitz 1960), and fusionist or pluralist theories exist. Post-liberal hybrid security theories explain democracy and international security better than "liberal peace" (Doyle 1986). Hybrid environments include pluralism, inclusion, and networking in daily practice, interaction, and decision-making. These environments include ongoing negotiation and contestation due to diverse people with different perspectives. To democratize security governance in transitional governments plagued by wars and complex insecurity, international organizations must establish a hybrid peace and security architecture. Theorizing hybrid security and civil-military relations does not provide a solid foundation for understanding democratic supervision in unstable transitional nations. The EU and other international organizations, including NATO, use

hybrid peace and security frameworks based on civil-military relations theories of democratic supervision to democratize security governance. However, these measures are unsuitable for the current situation and likely to fail.

A History of Pakistani Civil-Military Relations

Why does the military influence policy in a civilian-elected democracy like Pakistan? The subject of contemporary civil-military relations in Pakistan is the focus of this thesis. Michael Desch and Samuel Huntington have studied military impact on politics and government, but why the military does it remains unanswered. Although coups and direct military interventions in politics are rare, indirect military influence may persist and even dictate democratically elected political leaders' policies. Despite having a civilian democratically elected government, Pakistan's military leadership heavily influences its political affairs, requiring a deeper look. When did this level of control become necessary? What efforts has the civilian administration taken to reduce interference? Answering these questions will help answer the study's main question. Instead of focusing on democracy, this section will present a brief history of Pakistan post-India's partition to comprehend its military rise.

West and East Pakistan were formed after India's 1947 division. Pakistan, newly independent, was unable to establish democratic institutions for many reasons. Pakistan's founders wanted a Constituent Assembly to write a constitution. Jinnah centralized power in the Constituent Assembly, which was supposed to write a democratic constitution. According to Philip Oldenburg (2010), Jinnah consolidated all executive, legislative, and political authorities while weakening the prime minister. Jinnah also opposed political parties because he believed "they will undermine and seize what the Muslim League has accomplished." Jinnah's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, agreed: "those who established parties are traitors, deceivers, and hypocrites" (Allen McGrath, 1996). Democracy advanced due to Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan's premature deaths and power consolidation. In 1951, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly after Jinnah's death and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, strengthening the military-bureaucracy alliance and entrenching military rule.

Ethnic divisions, power concentration, and untimely deaths slowed democracy. We formed West and East Pakistan as Pakistani subdivisions. West Pakistan had an elite Urdu-speaking population, while East Pakistan had Bengali speakers. East Pakistan was marginalized by the ruling authority after division. Jinnah made Urdu Pakistan's official language, even though most Pakistanis were Bengalis or non-Bengalis. Bengalis faced many challenges, including underrepresentation in political and military institutions, a concentration of power in West Pakistan, and rising tensions between the West Pakistani elite and the Bengali majority in East Pakistan. It's hardly surprising that West Pakistan's elite didn't try to write a constitution after independence (Ahsan, 2005). According to Ahsan (2005), the elite feared losing influence to East Pakistan because the constitution required fair and transparent elections for new authorities. The Bengali majority in East Pakistan frightened Urdu and Punjabi elites. East Pakistan declared independence from West Pakistan in 1971, becoming Bangladesh. The breakup of East Pakistan allowed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to become prime minister through democratic elections. The absence of democratic institutions due to premature deaths, poor constitutional development, and ethnic differences allowed the military to shift from national security to politics.

Samuel Finer (1962) claims that a country without a strong political culture will allow military rule. Military interventions are limited by political culture. Political culture, or underlying rules, determine a political system's success or failure. Finer classifies military operations into six types. These include:

The regime depends on societal conditions, political culture, interventions, and approaches. Finer found that military interventions in countries without political structures and cultural contexts are difficult. Due to the lack of political structures and a cultural foundation, newly founded nations will struggle to build a democracy.

Harold Trinkunas (2010) agrees with Finer that new democracies without a supportive political culture are more vulnerable to military intervention. Trinkunas says civilian leadership must "construct" mechanisms that limit military dominance in state policy sectors where it prevails to facilitate power transfer to civilian entities when a nation moves to democracy. Considering the authority that "mandates and supervises the activities," civilian and military operations must be distinguished to prevent military access. The military will interfere in politics if stable and weak political institutions fail to maintain civilian supremacy. Civilian leaders use monitoring, "divide and conquer" techniques, and fines to keep the military in check and prevent political intrusion.

Military interference in politics supplements the lack of formal institutions. When legislators want to cut military spending and give control to the wards. Majeed (2010) highlights military authority-driven expenditure growth. The military receives new facilities, equipment, and compensation increases. If the civilian government tries to limit the military's influence on national security and foreign policy, tardiness often causes domestic instability. Ghoshal (2009) found that military intervention in politics is changing. Ghoshal calls this trend "authority devoid of responsibility and accountability" and claims the military does not directly. Today, the military subtly affects the Establishment and overthrows elected officials. This tendency arises when elected authorities try to take over military-run institutions, according to Ghoshal.

The appointment of Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator was expected. He became commander-in-chief under Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to ease Pakistan-India Kashmir tensions. Since partition, Pakistan and India have had difficult Kashmir relations because "contiguous Muslim majority areas would go to Pakistan." India initiated and completed Kashmir annexation. In view of Pakistan's objections, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told Liaquat Ali Khan that Kashmiris would choose between Pakistan and India. Liaquat Ali Khan wanted peace talks with India and was willing to take responsibility for hostilities, but Ziring (1971) claims that Pakistan and India were unwilling to resolve the Kashmir problem and exchanged accusations. After India offered peace talks, Pakistani high-ranking officers plotted to overthrow Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and restart the Kashmir conflict. Ayub Khan tried to reduce tensions between Pakistan and India as the military tried to undermine the civilian rule.

The failed "Rawalpindi Conspiracy" military coup in 1951 imprisoned poets, journalists, and high military personnel. Premier Liaquat Ali Khan was killed in Rawalpindi in 1951 while speaking at a public meeting. After Liaquat Ali Khan's death, many political appointments "may be viewed retrospectively as having resulted in administrative catastrophe for Pakistan" (Dryland, 1992). After Governor General Ghulam Muhammad deposed Urdu-speaking Bengali Khwaja Nazimuddin in 1958, East Bengal Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra took charge. Bogra served from 1953 until 1955. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad abolished the First Constituent Assembly in 1954 after the Muslim League's "nearly complete defeat in East Bengal that year, securing only two seats" (Dryland, 1992). Thus, West Pakistani Muslim League members dominated the Second Constituent Assembly. West Pakistani civil servant Chaudhri Muhammad Ali succeeded Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra in 1955, and West Pakistani political leaders dominated the Constituent Assembly. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad was replaced by President Iskander Mirza after he urged martial law to Ayub Khan. Dryland (1992) "between 1950 and 1958, Pakistan appointed seven prime ministers and one

commander in chief, a record likely due to the political immaturity of Pakistan's political aspirants" Hasan Rizvi (2013) further emphasizes that political leadership infighting and instability plagued the parliamentary system.

East Pakistan's Chief Minister Aatur Rehman Khan was fired by Governor A.K. Fazalul Huq in March 1958 after the provincial parliament rejected his budget plan. After approaching Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon, Rehman demanded Fazalul Hq's termination. After Huq's removal, an official became Acting Governor. Krishak Sramik Party leader Abu Hussain Sarkar was fired as minister by the acting governor. The expulsion of "one governor and two Chief Ministers" in two days and the death of the East Pakistan Assembly Deputy Speaker reinforced military authority. Military domination may have resulted from frequent leadership changes, political instability, and a heavy military use in domestic and foreign conflicts. Ayub Khan was needed to rebuild the Pakistani Army and restore peace in East Pakistan after the 1953, 1954, 1956, and 1958 riots and Lawlessness (Ziring, 1971) and to confront the Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951. Ayub Khan also restored order on the North West Frontier amid tribal and paramilitary conflicts (Ziring, 1971). Political unrest and failed economic policies led to martial law in 1958. Pakistan's treasury was drained and foreign exchange reserves were low in 1958 due to a paucity of consumer goods, rising prices, food shortages, financial indiscipline, and government deficit financing (Rizvi 2013). The First Five-Year Plan was passed in 1958. Hoarding, illegal market operations, and smuggling powered Pakistan's economy. Political analysts say Ayub Khan declared martial law to protect himself from India, his southern neighbor. As internal strife left the nation susceptible to external threats, Ayub Khan argued for military leadership. Historical events suggest that the military rose to power due to inadequate political leadership, excessive military dependence, and economic collapse. Democratic norms and institutions may be unnecessary if the military can secure economic growth and law and order, especially if the public supports it. The economic and political conditions under Ayub Khan are discussed here.

General Yahya Khan's 1969–1971 Presidency

Yahya Khan took office unopposed in 1969 after Ayub Khan resigned as Pakistan's martial law administrator and president. In his early tenure, Yahya Khan mimicked Ayub Khan due to his political inexperience. The "Provisional Constitution Order" issued by Yahya Khan states that Pakistan will follow the 1962 constitution until the 1973 constitution is implemented. Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan are president-military leaders who received legislative and financial power under the 1962 Constitution. The executive had more power than the 156-member National Assembly (Rizvi, 2013). Similar to the Ayub Khan regime, the judiciary lost the power to reverse Chief Martial Law Authority judgments and could not exercise its 1962 Constitutional rights. Military regimes limited the administration, legislature, and judiciary, allowing the military to rise unchecked and dismantle democratic institutions. Due to his political inexperience, Yahya Khan promoted Ayub Khan's counselors. In the early months of Martial Law, Yahya Khan managed the central and provincial administrations with the help of a small group of trusted advisors, including the President's staff, officers, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, and three Deputy Chiefs (Rivzi, 2013). I suggest that the military effectively navigated the Ayub Khan internal crises and dominated all institutions due to a small number of military commanders' alliance and strength. Military leaders acquired power by maintaining foreign support when political groups and politicians recovered popularity.

Yahya Khan, like Ayub Khan, had administrative issues. Dacca Students opposed martial law in 1969. Ayub Khan had banned strikes and demonstrations, and Yahya Khan tightened the ban after Dacca student protests. The students hid from Yahya Khan's arrest orders, foiling his goal. The

country went into civil war after Yahya Khan promised to restore democracy and used force. Yahya Khan was more concerned with labor problems than Ayub Khan. He restored collective bargaining and strikes, made trade union recognition easier, and "reduced the administrator's powers of prosecuting a union in a court of law in cases of default and extended legal protection to the offices bears of a union" (Rizvi, 2013). In 1970, Yahya Khan passed the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance to reduce wealth concentration. Dacca has created the Equity Participation Fund to "augment the capital resources of small and medium-sized enterprises in the private sector of East Pakistan and the underdeveloped regions of West Pakistan" (Rizvi, 2013).

The Fourth Five Year Plan, launched the same year, focused on resource allocation and economic growth. However, East Pakistani political leaders demanded that the new plan fix the Third Five Year Plan, criticizing it. Some thought the 1970 government should support the new proposal. Corruption, cronyism, and nepotism in the public sector are rising under Yahya Khan's new policies and martial law restrictions (Rizvi, 2013). Martial Law Regulation 58 placed 303 Class I civil officers on administrative leave in 1969. Due to office misconduct allegations for eleven years. Yahya Khan unified Chitral, Swat, and Dir into West Pakistan. Re-partitioning West Pakistan into Baluchistan, Punjab, Sindh, and the NWFP was done by one unit. Yahya Khan appointed personnel to ensure "free and fair elections." Pakistan's Supreme Court Justice Abdus Sattar is the Chief Election Commissioner, creating "electoral rolls and delineating constituencies" (Rizvi, 2013). Yahya Khan's Legal Framework Order outlined the National Assembly's constitution-drafting principles and general election criteria. West Pakistani politicians began touring East Pakistan to recruit support for the elections, but the eastern provinces criticized them. According to Rizvi (2013), some East Pakistanis claimed that the central government and West Pakistani political class were inattentive to their region.

The October 1970 Pakistani elections were postponed to December 1970 due to the East Pakistan cyclone. This election was dominated by the Pakistan People's Party and the East Pakistan Awami League. The elections, which were crucial to his rule, determined whether the elected government could write a constitution Yahya Khan would approve. East and West Pakistan remained politically estranged after the elections. West Pakistan made social and economic progress, but East Pakistan lagged due to resource shortages. Yahya Khan neglected East Pakistan, resulting in inadequate industry and infrastructure. These causes ignited the Bangladesh independence movement and led to the East-West Pakistan civil war. India helped East Pakistan separate from West Pakistan during the conflict, ending Yahya Khan's administration and enabling Z.A. Bhutto's rise.

When it grabbed political authority from civilian authorities, the Pakistani military was striving to establish itself as an autonomous and powerful organization. The military implemented economic changes to secure public favor. Note that these changes were temporary. Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies system, which connected the public to their government, collapsed owing to administrative incompetence and corruption. The failure to crush student uprisings and the 1965 Jammu and Kashmir dispute with India contributed to Ayub's regime's downfall, along with systemic flaws. As Ayub Khan's legitimacy declined, Yahya Khan gained military power. The second president to enforce martial law was Yahya Khan in 1969 when Ayub Khan declined to run again. Yahya Khan abolished the 1962 Constitution and the "One Unit" system, which united provinces by ethnicity. The "Establishment" criticized Yahya for promising to increase East Pakistan's parliamentary representation and holding universal suffrage elections. Pakistan and India fought when West Pakistan refused to recognize or support East Pakistan after the elections.

Zia Ul Haq's Martial Law

In the previous chapter, we reviewed Bhutto's government and how internal and foreign politics and stalled economic growth contributed to her dismissal and murder conviction. Bhutto's presidency was crucial after two martial laws. Zia ul Haq's martial law and Bhutto's death ended the democratic promise he represented. Zia ul Haq promised free and fair elections and civilian leaders, but he never delivered. This chapter examines Zia ul Haq's political and economic actions during the Soviet Union's collapse and their long-term effects. After martial law and the 1973 Constitution were suspended, Zia ul Haq became CMLA in 1977. Previous martial laws disbanded the federal and provincial ministries and national and provincial assemblies. The prime minister and opposition party leaders were jailed, but the Pakistani president was permitted to stay and the province's high court chief justices became governors. The Military Council had final say. Pakistan was again divided into five zones, each with its own martial law administrator, as under Ayub. Zia ul Haq promised to strengthen democracy in Pakistan within three months of taking power. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's release, which drew large crowds to his rallies and postponed elections, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and other military-backed parties struggled to win.

Bhutto challenged the military and PNA to challenge her authority, which led to military charges, including a murder for which she was a co-conspirator. Rizvi claims that under martial law, "martial law authorities issued several White Papers encompassing 2,771 pages detailing how Bhutto manipulated the March 1977 elections, how he and his family undermined governmental institutions and procedures, and how they obtained or extended illegal favors to others" (Rizvi, 2013). The 1978 Supreme Court sentenced Bhutto to death for murder. The military changed the electoral process and delayed elections until 1979, although political parties strongly opposed it. Not all political parties supported the deal. PPP members won the majority of seats in military-convened nonpartisan elections. In reaction to these findings, the military postponed the polls again, citing inadequate voting conditions. General Zia ul Haq abolished martial law and held elections in 1985. However, Zia ul Haq retained major control over the civilian administration when Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo was elected. In 1988, Zia ul Haq fired Junejo for his Afghanistan and Ojhri missteps (Talbot, 1998).

Zia ul Haq prioritized Islamization over overturning the 1973 Constitution. Zia reconciled with President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry, allowing him to continue governing. After President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry resigned in 1978, Zia ul Haq became Chief Martial Law Administrator. Zia ul Haq's political restrictions at the start of his military rule sparked protests. According to Rizvi (2013), the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, founded in 1981 by the PPP and other parties, has been criticized by notable figures. Zia ul Haq advocated a constitutional guaranty allowing the military to collaborate with the political class on national decisions. He created the National Security Council (NSC), with eleven members with direct political and constitutional power. President Zia ul Haq appointed prominent military leaders to run the National Security Council. This allowed them to veto political decisions by leaders and proclaim a state of emergency, making them crucial decision-makers. NSC was no longer required. The martial law administration added military officers to civil service positions. These military commanders were assigned to civil administration, semi-governmental, and autonomous enterprises and had access to special Central Superior Services groups (Rizvi, 2013). Civilians who had applied for District Management Group and Foreign Service of Pakistan postings were outraged by military appointments. Zia ul Haq, like Ayub and Yahya, intended to limit political power to military personnel. American assistance helped Zia ul Haq expand Pakistan's military during the Afghan-Soviet conflict, making it one of the strongest.

Zia ul Haq was crucial throughout the Afghanistan-Soviet war. Talbot (1998) lists numerous variables that explain Zia's war involvement. Talbot (1998) states that most historians believe Zia supported the Afghan cause to receive Western economic and military aid, particularly from the US. Zia fought in Afghanistan to "support the mujahideen as a jihad which might eventually disseminate the Islamic revolution to the Central Asian republics" (Talbot, 1998). Talbot (1998) claims these interpretations ignore Pakistan-India and Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Military aid and a Western alliance were essential to reduce India's influence over Pakistan and ease Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions over Pushtunistan. Pakistan did not fear a Soviet invasion because India was a bigger threat. After taking government, Indira Gandhi did not denounce the Soviet invasion. The invasion of Afghanistan increased "the burgeoning Indo-Soviet trade connections and Indian dependence on Soviet armaments," but it also hindered India's efforts to restore relations with Pakistan, forcing Pakistan to join the US. In autumn 1981, Zia ul Haq proposed a nuclear-free zone and "no war" with India, according to Talbot (1998). India disagreed and noted Pakistan's purchase of "F-16 fighters, weaponry, and aid packages from the Reagan administration." Zia ul Haq's dominance was impenetrable since Pakistan was a U.S. ally against the Soviets. Despite receiving "\$3.2 billion from Washington over six years," Zia ul Haq allegedly "evaded American pressures advocating for a return to democracy and the protection of human rights." Jaffrelot (2000) claims Zia ul Haq initiated nuclear programs and profited from the Afghan war. According to Jaffrelot (2000), military spending was 6.9% of GDP and 29.1% of the budget in 1981.

Military Governance Decline: A New Era of Democracy?

A bloodless military coup in 1999 ended Nawaz Sharif's second tenure as PM. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, took power and became president. From 1999 to 2008, he oversaw the military. Pakistan struggled to create a democratic political and economic climate. Post-9/11 US-Pakistan ties gave Pakistan's military unprecedented authority and responsibility. As discussed in the previous chapter about Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif, the military justified its involvement in politics and decision-making due to efforts to reduce military influence, political and economic instability, and international intervention. This chapter covers 1999–2017, focusing on General Pervez Musharraf's military rule, President Asif Ali Zardari's democracy, and Nawaz Sharif's third term.

Pervez Musharraf ruled Pakistan militarily from 1999 to 2008. His regime combined lifestyle liberalism and authoritarianism. Internationally, it was considered "unfashionable" and despised, especially after the military interventions, which threatened Musharraf's authority. US sanctions against Pakistan were triggered under "Section 508 of the Annual Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act," after the 1999 coup that overthrew Nawaz Sharif's elected government. Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not declare martial law. Musharraf became Chief Executive instead of imposing martial law. Western elites, radical civil society organizations, and the military-appointed Prime Minister, M.Z. Jamali, supported Musharraf throughout his presidency. These considerations helped Musharraf form a government with a political elite and bureaucrats and technocrats. The supreme judiciary gave Musharraf the ability to hold elections "three years subsequent to his coup." As promised, Musharraf held elections in 2002, with a "pro-military coalition securing a plurality of seats, while a coalition of Islamist parties exhibited an unexpectedly robust performance." After the results, 18 Pakistani political parties formed the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD), but Musharraf minimized its impact with a court judgment. Pervez Musharraf strengthened his authority by amending the Constitution the same year he became Chief of Army and President of Pakistan. After an agreement with Islamic opposition groups, Musharraf resigned from the military in 2005 and implemented constitutional

revisions in Parliament in 2003. In 2004, the National Security Council (NSC) gave the military more legitimacy by supervising the civilian cabinet. The Council sought to institutionalize the army's governance. This follows Musharraf's unusual move to promote his close friend Shaukat Aziz from finance minister to prime minister. This move sidelined the opponent and showed Musharraf's discontent with etiquette.

As the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan strengthened Zia ul Haq's regime, the 9/11 attacks prevented Musharraf's overthrow. When Musharraf took power, the US cut off Pakistan's financial aid, but after 9/11, the US saw Pakistan as a key player in the global fight against terrorism and a staunch supporter of "Musharraf's administration represents the most promising prospect for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan." Congress lifted restrictions and authorized large US financial aid to Pakistan. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the Bush Administration did not publicly criticize Pakistan's domestic procedures while highlighting the need to develop civilian political systems. Musharraf legitimized his military rule with "continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions," which hampered Pakistan's democracy attempts, through a US partnership. Although democratic political institutions were strengthened, the military's dominance destabilized and undermined Pakistan's political parties and civil society. Musharraf's major policy changes post-9/11 were driven by external factors. The trajectory of Pakistan's policy shift is appropriate, but the pace is too slow, awkward, and unpredictable to build momentum. Despite US support, Musharraf was a "marginal satisfier," doing the bare minimum. Numerous political analysts and correspondents believe that secular political parties must be allowed to operate in the system to stabilize and sustain democracy. Like Zia ul Haq, Western aid legitimized military rule and hindered Pakistan's democratic growth. Negotiations with the military by the US aim to restore democratic institutions in Pakistan, boosting its economy and making it a moderate Muslim state. I argue that the US can monitor political developments through its financial aid, which enforces its military rule in Pakistan. So, "Pakistan's tenuous democratic institutions are perpetually endangered by the authoritarian pressures exerted by the nation's formidable military and quasi-feudal economic frameworks.

Pakistani ethnic communities condemned Musharraf's unique military coup. The army's 2005 sexual assaults on women exacerbated Baluchistan tribal-military relations. The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) attacked facilities, programs, and persons in response to calls for political autonomy and natural resource control. Musharraf rejected Baluchi political autonomy and launched a paramilitary operation to fight insurgency, worsening the humanitarian catastrophe and human rights abuses. As Musharraf's ties with tribal groups deteriorated, NGOs, labor unions, and human rights advocates lost support. Women were barred from voting and standing for office by social and religious conservatives, and minority groups were likewise marginalized in politics. As Pakistan's smaller institutions addressed human rights breaches like "forced disappearances," torture, and discrimination against women and religious minorities, the worldwide shift toward democracy affected the nation. Trade unions cannot strike or bargain, but NGOs can distribute critical content. Pakistani domestic politics developing with global politics threatened Musharraf's regime and led to his 2008 overthrow. The military restricted most media and violated activists' and NGOs' human rights. Military leaders would intimidate media outlets and journalists, censor them with blasphemy laws, or fire them for expressing opinions that challenged military power. A angry mob attacked foreign press in 2002, denying Indian journalists entry. In the same year, Islamic extremists kidnaped and killed Wall Street Journal writer Daniel Pearl. Police, hired thugs, and Islamic fanatics beat reporters. A 2003 piece criticizing intelligence agencies forced editor Shaheen Sehba to retire. Shots at journalists' trucks prevented them from reporting on the 2005 tribal unrest near Afghanistan, killing two and injuring two. Human rights abuses, press freedom

issues, and tribal strife weakened Musharraf's authority. I believe Musharraf's 2008 military takeover forced these parties to form a crucial Lawyers Movement coalition.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

The military is a reflection of civil society yet different in all social structures. The reason is simple: military might has dominated history. Though wrong, history is seen as a combat chronicle. In some societies, "to serve" means military service, and a "officer" is a troop commander. Alexander, Genghis Khan, Saladin, and Napoleon were formidable warriors and leaders. After retiring from the military, Atatürk, De Gaulle, and Eisenhower were revered as national leaders. In Pakistan, the military has a special standing for numerous reasons. Most of Pakistan has been conquered and crossed by aggressive armies, forcing its people to adapt to and withstand greater military force. Fertile, the region thrives on agriculture. Conflict has always been costly. Thus, compromise and acquiescence were more practical than rebellion and struggle. Indeed, some economically challenged people saw foreign alliances as beneficial. Pakistan added another reason to give the military special status.

Pakistan, like India, emerged from British India after colonial rule and experienced succession issues. Because of insecurity, Pakistan's armed forces were seen as both a guardian of national security and a symbol of sovereignty. Military commanders like Zia protected the nation's "ideology". They may have been inspired by the Turkish military, which views itself as secular identity guards. Our military did not defend its nation like Turkey did. However, like Turkey, their larger-than-life position inspired them to shape national policy and capture political power. The coup culprits were guarantyd public support or minimal opposition in both locales. These variables affect Pakistan's civil-military ties, although the Army's ongoing and growing political involvement dominates.

Many Pakistanis, if not most, support a military takeover due to poor civil society service. This aids the Army in quick peacekeeping. If the military fails long-term, there are good reasons. Complex civil affairs require patience and persistence. In contrast, the army is taught to achieve particular goals within a set timeline. However, deeper reasons exist. The military is part of the "establishment." Due to its constraints, it operates through other state institutions. The population receives the same treatment, but now they hate the soldiers. After being neglected during democratic regimes, the civil bureaucracy resents military rule. Military personnel often have higher-paying jobs. Military political power is also lacking. Unity and authority are its foundations. Instead, politics must be more inclusive and multicultural. The military faces legitimacy issues and public engagement issues upon taking power. Therefore, it uses extreme means to remedy these irregularities, including novel judicial and constitutional remedies and unreliable referenda.

National security has never been military-only. Physical strength provided essential survival security in ancient societies. Physical protection was simply one requirement for civilization's growth. The increased complexity and cost of warfare requires a strong domestic economic and technical foundation to sustain any significant defense capability. Greek, Roman, Egyptian, and Mongolian armies relied on effective administrative and political systems relevant to their eras. As warfare has become more devastating and has effects beyond conflict zones, diplomacy has become a nation's first line of defense. Domestic, international, and defense policy underpin a resilient security framework. As mentioned, military dominance undermines at least one pillar, notably the domestic pillar. After taking power, the military initially resists increasing defense spending but eventually does so owing to institutional pressures. This is not the true harm of the military's privileged status, in or out of power. Absolute defense spending is low. More

fundamentally, the military, which is unaccountable to civilians or external parties, allocates a large portion of its budget to institutional caprices, stifling innovation to improve the costly defense system and resulting in suboptimal value for expenditure.

The Army's privileged role in our power system has done the most harm by excluding civilian decision-makers from security policymaking or avoiding counterproductive measures. Sometimes they mustered the will to change a policy. However, when it failed due to a lackluster effort or poorly designed reforms, they blamed the Army. There is a widespread belief that security policies are the exclusive domain of the military. Benazir Bhutto led the first elected administration after Zia's death in December 1988. The Soviet evacuation from Afghanistan was practically complete. The major change in circumstances prompted the new government to initiate a policy review. Some military elements opposed it, although not because they opposed a civilian government's security strategy. They saw themselves as caretakers of a heritage, especially one that had triumphed (the 20th century miracle and Soviet retreat). Our post-Soviet Afghan policy improved after the evaluation was concluded. The insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir began in early 1990. The government wisely included all political parties in their deliberations. The military establishment was unopposed and participated in all briefings and deliberations. Nawaz Sharif's administration took power that year.

Contrary to popular assumption, the new prime minister wanted to improve relations with India without addressing the Kashmir issue. He actively contacted Narasimha Rao after his 1991 election as Indian prime minister. No Army interference ended the endeavor, although a strong foundation was lacking before starting the peace process. Progress was possible after its completion in 1997, during Nawaz Sharif's second tenure. Ms. Bhutto reportedly took a tough attitude toward India under military compulsion. The opposition, led by Nawaz Sharif, accused her of being "soft" on India and trying to "roll back" Afghanistan, Kashmir, and nuclear policy during her first term. After reclaiming power, she recklessly attacked her critics to prove them wrong. She suffered severe setbacks. Several allied states intervened to prevent a major conflict over the Kashmir issue at the UN. The publication earlier reported Nawaz Sharif's unhappiness in trying to reduce tensions with India. He appointed his foreign secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, to negotiate with Salman Haider after his 1997 re-election after gaining knowledge. The two professionals, supported by political will (I. K. Gujral, the Indian Prime Minister, was equally enthusiastic), created the "composite dialogue." This is not the place to discuss its design rationale or subsequent methods. For the concept to survive the Kargil battle, the 1999 military takeover in Pakistan, and the 2002 impasse between the two states, it must have been based on strong thinking. The most important thing is that it was civilian. The Pakistani military let its civilian government learn peacemaking by not intruding.

The then Army Chief advised a political leader to make a major decision. The May 1998 Indian nuclear tests presented a problem for Pakistan, which had the technology to reply. We performed many tests due to political and psychological considerations. These would have been followed by harsh sanctions that would have worsened our economic situation. Chief of Army Staff Jehangir Karamat informed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that his government would manage the post-test situation domestically and internationally, so the decision should fundamentally be his, in consultation with the cabinet. The anomalous relationship between civil society and the military has created an atypical structure at the top of our power hierarchy. Our political vocabulary calls it "the troika." In civilian times, the prime minister is the chief executive. The other person is the Army chief. The trio includes the president, who has more power because the military believes a coup or judicial scrutiny are insufficient to limit elected institutions. The plan may work. The original troika, the Russian three-horse sleigh, was drawn in the same direction, therefore calling it

a "troika" is misleading. Even under ideal conditions, our trio has a delicate equilibrium. It often caused territorial wars. The Army chief has exclusive control over physical force, but only in emergencies. He needs authority to influence policy decisions in most cases. The president has extraordinary constitutional authority, but he can only use it in dire circumstances, likely with the military's implicit support and at the risk of judicial condemnation and reversal. A smart prime minister can dominate within these limits. Not all of them are politicians or elected to run governments.

This shaky troika alliance caused several unpleasant clashes during our last civilian interlude, 1988–99. All our military and civilian authorities want a compliant judiciary. They respect legal protection but dislike its complicated rules. Military control requires Supreme Court legitimacy and relies on it throughout its tenure. Thus, requesting a new oath to reconfirm commitment is sometimes necessary to remove stubborn judges. In her first stint as prime minister (1988–90), Benazir Bhutto said the president had to accept her advice when appointing Supreme Court judges. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan interpreted differently. It nearly forced the nation's two top leaders to go to court. The third member of the Troika, General Aslam Beg, the Chief of Army Staff, mediated the resolution. This was not the first time the president and prime minister asked the Army to resolve a deadlock that threatened government functionality. Army Chief Jehangir Karamat was summoned from a foreign trip to mediate a dispute between Prime Minister Sharif and President Farooq Leghari over Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah's activities during Nawaz Sharif's second term.

The President and Chief Justice resigned this time after their efforts failed. According to the prime minister's supporters, that was one of the worst Supreme Court moments. On another time, an army general intervened and forced the president and prime minister to resign. To gain political power, Nawaz Sharif clashed with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in his first term. General Waheed Kakar, the former Chief of Army Staff, tried to mediate a less severe settlement, but the Prime Minister insisted that both sides must quit to have new elections. Nawaz Sharif disliked all presidents save Rafiq Tarar, who was like a family member, and the army chiefs with whom he worked. He proposed governing the country like a Karachi donkey cart, with one animal carrying the load while the others execute their duties. Benazir Bhutto, while certainly obsessed with unchecked power, was more realistic. In her first administration, she made many awkward attempts to limit military involvement. She said the president could nominate a service leader, but the prime minister could dismiss him, and that the ISI head must not be endorsed by the Army leader. She kept the Army's goodwill during her second term. However, selecting a loyalist to that position failed to appease the president. She was removed by her former deputy, Farooq Leghari, on her second term. Despite their differences, the Pak-US alliance was based on security. To fight India, Pakistan sought a powerful ally.

After failing to convince India, the larger and more favored alternative, to join the anti-communist coalition, the US saw the worth in forming a security partnership with Pakistan. This encouraged tight coordination between the two forces, which unintentionally altered civil-military relations in Pakistan. I do not believe the US or its military ever supported the Pakistan Army's political power. However, its unique relationship with the US defense establishment benefited it anytime it engaged. Despite the need to discuss Pakistan's recent democratic decline, pragmatic issues including the Soviet threat, its foray into Afghanistan, and the nuclear dimension forced American leadership to maintain a "policy of engagement" with Pakistan's military. Not too painful. Hegemonic powers like the US like to work with client state leaders who are unrestrained by institutional restrictions like parliamentary systems or public opinion. That caused Pakistani problems. It's become common here to doubt American intentions and criticize their policies.

Disillusioned with the military dictatorship, they criticized the US for imperialism. After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the military-led government in Islamabad's involvement, most Pakistanis believe their Army was fighting an American war. US aid to Pakistan has always included a significant defense component. America provides two-thirds of its overt and covert aid for military purposes. Hardware allotment and insufficient investment in indigenous infrastructure have created a reliance relationship typical of history. The Pakistani military will become dependent on modern technology and the US supply chain, making it difficult to change the connection, even when necessary. A Potential Prescription Our civil-military equilibrium favors the coercive apparatus. The Army must control damage because it directly administered the country for more than half its existence and wielded disproportionate influence afterward. True, it tried to improve civil-military relations but also protect national security interests from our uncertain politics.

After civilian rule was reinstated in December 1988, the GHQ's first document to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stressed the need for national security consensus. It worried that political parties would abuse any issue, even national security, given to the country's peculiar politics. As indicated in this article, Ms. Bhutto demanded a revision of the Afghan Policy during her first term. Her opposition, led by Nawaz Sharif, said she threatened the nation's core interests, despite being a valid government prerogative. For her part, she behaved similarly. She mocked Nawaz Sharif and suggested he wear bangles when he was undecided following the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. However, when he requested the counter-tests, the woman lamented that the nation was now isolated. The GHQ document suggested establishing a "national security advisory group" with public, private, and political experts. The goal was to form a core committee to evaluate major security concerns and offer government policy options. Additionally, it would be a great opportunity for opinion and policy leaders to learn about security policy development and implementation. Involving the opposition could dissuade them from politicizing security concerns and ensuring they are well-informed after taking power. In our history of military engagement, the immediate response to this proposal has been: "this must be yet another stratagem by the Army to sustain its dominance through alternative methods." To address these concerns, the military has consistently stated (and conveyed to other governments) that such a body—a group or council—should exclude service chiefs and include only the CJCSC chairman as an ex-officio member. As a "civilian" national security institution, it was meant to advise. Civil-military relations represent civil society's view of its military. Pakistani politics' vertical and horizontal divisions have increased the military's role. Different people see it as a fire brigade, adjudicator, or messiah. When it fails to meet expectations—often due to its unsuitability for such tasks—the military is portrayed as a predatory class ready to gain power and keep its authority, even by covert manipulation. The military has historically resisted these unusual duties. Ironically, its adverse impact on culture and ability to fulfill its basic function limits it, not awareness. After taking power, the repercussions are worse. It has all the ills of absolute authority, including an unhealthy civil-military relationship and a pervasive belief that the military is the root cause of all problems (an exaggerated perspective) and that it controls national security policy. In contrast, the Army has failed to change this impression by remaining aloof to support civilian decision-making. The civilian and military sectors must reach a consensus on key security concerns to succeed. The deep political divide that helps the military rise to power is the biggest hurdle.

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